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Abstract 
 
7KH8.·VGHFLVLRQWROHDYHWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ(8KDVSUHVHQWHGLQQXPHUDEOH
challenges for both the leaving state and the EU. In these unchartered waters, the future 
of UK involvement in EU policies is much in doubt. The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) has not been at the forefront of the debates about Brexit, though with 
LQFUHDVLQJIRFXVRQWKH(8·VJOREDOUROHWKHGHSDUWXUHRIWKH8.LVOLNHO\WRKDYH
significant effects. The purpose of this article is to consider the past, present and future 
role played by the UK in the CFSP since its inception in the Treaty on European Union. 
This necessitates consideration of how the CFSP might develop in the future and fulfil 
the goals of the recent Global Strategy. The article H[SORUHVWKH8.·V constant 
opposition to greater integration in EU foreign policy and how it has purported to 
distance itself from the CFSP machinery. 7KLVFDQEHFRQWUDVWHGZLWKWKH8.·VDSSDUHQW
post-referendum enthusiasm for pursuing shared foreign policy goals. Whilst the CFSP 
may EHXQGXO\DIIHFWHGE\WKH8.·VGHSDUWXUHQHLWKHUGRHVLWPHDQWKDW the CFSP will 
automatically become more integrated in the future. To achieve this, greater commitment 
will need to be shown by the EU27 to the aims of the CFSP and other Member States 
will no longer be able to count on the UK as the lead voice of opposition RU¶EUDNH·RQ
integration. If there is a continued desire for the UK to be involved in the CFSP, finding 
an acceptable model for cooperation is a substantial challenge. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Constructing a coherent and viable Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the 
European Union (EU) has been a longstanding component of the European integration 
process. The search for such a foreign policy for the Union has been at times tortuous, 
with the perceived ¶IDLOXUHV·LQWHUPVRIWKH(8·VLQDELOLW\WRUHDFW to global events 
overshadowing any of its successes. The latest effort to push the process forward in 
establishing and consolidating the EU as a meaningful international actor is the ¶*OREDO
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EURINT Iasi, Romania, May 2017; ANTERO Conference, University College Dublin, 
,UHODQG-XQH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GeopolitLFDO&RQWH[W·/LYHUSRRO-RKQ0RRUHV8QLYHUVLW\8.-XQHI am grateful 
to the participants in these events and the anonymous referees for their comments. Some 
of the findings below were presented as evidence to the 8.3DUOLDPHQW·VForeign Affairs 
Committee LQTXLU\LQWR¶7KHIXWXUHRI%ULWDLQ·VGLSORPDWLFUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK(XURSH· 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/foreign-affairs-committee/inquiries1/parliament-2017/britains-diplomatic-
relationship-with-europe-17-19/publications/> accessed 5 December 2017.  
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6WUDWHJ\·SXEOLVKHGLQ-XQH1 However, in a case of unfortunate timing, on the 23 
June 2016, the electorate of the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU in a referendum 
by a narrow majority of 51.9%. The departure of one of the largest Member States of the 
EU has overshadowed much of what the Global Strategy has set out to do, as well as 
absorbing institutional resources. As the UK embarks on the legal process of leaving the 
EU, a whole range of complex legal issues need to be urgently resolved. These issues 
illuminate the extent to which national law and EU law have been intertwined since the 
UK joined in 1973, but also that accounts of the development and nature of the EU legal 
system are not singular.  
 
The CFSP does not follow the same script of legal integration as in other areas. 
Discussion of familiar concepts of direct effect and supremacy is largely irrelevant in this 
area. ,QGHHGZKHWKHUWKH&)63FDQEHVDLGWRJHQHUDWH¶ODZ·KDVEHHQWKHVXEMHFWRI
debate since the CFSP was created in the Treaty on European Union 1992. Nevertheless, 
as Member States who have joined the EU since 1992 can testify, the CFSP forms part 
of the EU acquis and there are therefore specific challenges to consider relating to the 
8.·VZLWKGUDZDOQRWOHDVWWKHZD\VLQZKLFKWKH&)63LVOLQNHGWRRWKHUOHJDO
dimensions of the EU integration process. The dividing lines between legal competence 
in the CFSP and other, overlapping areas, continues to generate case law in the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU). 7KHOHJDOG\QDPLFVRIWKH&)63LQWKH(8·VOHJDORUGer are 
therefore not settled. The future of the UK outside the EU and potential models for 
UK-EU cooperation within the CFSP is closely related these legal dynamics. Much will 
depend on the political will of the UK and EU to cooperate in matters of foreign policy, 
though there is no obvious model of a cooperation framework readily available. 
 
The article considers how the history and practice of UK engagement in the CFSP 
suggests how the policy might take shape in the future. This article first considers the 
specific nature of the CFSP as a legal construct, and WKH8.·VUROHLQLQIOXHQFLQJWKH
policy and its legal status as we know it today. The question posed therefore has two 
related parts: what effect could Brexit have on the CFSP itself, and what role (if any) 
might the UK play in the future? To appreciate ERWKWKHIXWXUHRIWKH8.·VIRUHLJQ
policy outside of the EU, and the CFSP itself it is necessary to trace the history of the 
policy in detail, followed by WKH8.·VLQYROYHPHQW in it and influence over ² in particular 
² its legal status. Considering the place of the CFSP in the run-up to and aftermath of 
the referendum is necessary. In doing so, the argument made here is three-fold. 
 
First, the UK has been at the forefront of efforts to keep the CFSP separate within the 
(8·VOHJDORUGHUIt has also, in the pre-referendum period, sought to downplay the role 
of the CFSP in the pursuit of national foreign policy goals. Therefore, the departure of 
the UK may allow for a potentially more integrated CFSP to take shape in the absence of 
the UK as a difficult partner, but this is not guaranteed. Rather, it will require much more 
FRPPLWPHQWWRWKH&)63·VJRDOVIURPWKHUHPDLQLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHV who will no 
longer have the barrier to further cooperation and integration that the UK represented. 
 
Second, the Global Strategy emphasises the promotion of long-term changes via the 
FRQFHSWRI¶UHVLOLHQFH·SDUWLFXODUO\LQWKH(8·VQHLJKERXUKRRG 7KH(8·VVWUHQJWKVLQ
securing cooperation from third states often relies on other aspects of EU law in which 
                                                 
1 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy¶A Global 
Strategy for tKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·V)RUHLJQDQGSecurity Policy: Shared Vision, Common 
$FWLRQ$6WURQJHU(XURSH·%UXVVHOV 
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the UK was not fully part of. This also suggests that the EU will not unduly suffer from 
the departure of the UK, but that the UK will find it more difficult to upload any 
national foreign policy goals given its absence from the decision-making and policy-
making institutions. 
 
Third, that unlike in other areas of EU integration, the departure of the UK as seen 
through the prism of the CFSP shows that it is akin to a logical ¶next step·. This is due to 
the gradual ambivalence to foreign policy coordination shown by the UK in recent years 
and even efforts to demonstrate a foreign policy strategy which does not prioritise an EU 
focus. 7KLVLVLQVSLWHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VSRVW-UHIHUHQGXPHQWKXVLDVPIRUD¶GHHS·
partnership with the EU but with little in the way of concrete proposals for 
operationalisation. Whilst nevertheless following a complex process of extraction, the 
specificity of the CFSP means that leaving is likely WRSURYHWREHOHVVRID¶VKRFN·WRWhe 
EU system. Future cooperation in the CFSP will be dependent on general agreements 
underpinning a new UK-EU relationship, and as the process of the Brexit negotiations 
so far demonstrates, it is a process fraught with difficulty. 
 
The CFSP LQWKH(8·VOHJDORUGHUODZEXWQRWDVZHNQRZLW 
 
The CFSP was one of the major innovations contained in the Treaty on European 
Union, signed at Maastricht in 1992. Accompanied by much fanfare, the EU was now 
going to be endowed with the ability to establish an identity as a global political actor as 
well as an economic one. $FFRUGLQJWRWKH7UHDW\¶7KH8QLRQ·VFRPSHWHQFHLQPDWWHUVRI
common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all 
questions relatinJWRWKH8QLRQ·VVHFXULW\· (Article 24 (1) TEU). It is thus an expansive 
provision that gives the impression of a major shift in the role of the EU into the realm 
of (non-economic) international affairs. In reality, the CFSP codified informal practices 
and discussions on foreign policy between the Member States dating back to the 1970s. 
This became known as European Political Cooperation in the 1980s but operated on a 
largely informal, incremental basis.2 Against the background of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and collapse of WKH6RYLHW8QLRQWKH7(8·Vgrand statements about the emergence and 
capacity of the EU as a foreign policy actor were immediately tested in the Balkans and 
Rwanda, and found to be lacking. The mismatch between the aims and the ability of the 
EU to be seen as an effective, coherent actor has plagued the CFSP since its inception ² 
whether or not one considers if it should be judged against the benchmark of what is 
expected of a foreign policy of a nation state.3 
 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive history of EPC, see Simon J. Nuttall, European Political Cooperation 
(Oxford University Press 1992). 
3 The earliest and most widely cited statement relating to this is that of Christopher Hill 
DQGKLV¶FDSDELOLW\-H[SHFWDWLRQV· gap: ChrLVWRSKHU+LOO¶The capability²expectations gap 
or conceptualisLQJ(XURSH·VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUROH· 31 JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 305. This concept led to a stream of literature during the 1990s and 2000s 
which has characterised the general academic approach to CFSP. See also: Roy H. 
*LQVEHUJ¶&RQFHSWXDOL]LQJWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDVDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$FWRU1DUURZLQJ
the Theoretical Capability-([SHFWDWLRQV*DS·-&06-RXUQDORI&RPPRQ0DUNHW
6WXGLHVDQG.ULVWLDQ/1LHOVHQ¶(86RIW3RZHr and the Capability-Expectations 
*DS·-RXUQDORI&RQWHPSRUDU\(XURSHDQ5HVHDUFK 
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The characterisation of the post-Maastricht 7UHDW\DUUDQJHPHQWVDVD¶SLOODU·VWUXFWXUH
with the CFSP as the second pillar, has been analysed in depth by legal scholars.4 
Subsequent Treaty revisions have attempted to address institutional weaknesses in the 
CFSP. One of the main weaknesses is the confusion over which institutions (and what 
powers they have) represent or act on behalf of the EU. After all, the CFSP is only one 
RIWKH(8·VH[WHUQDOO\-facing policies, despite its expansive definition in the Treaty. The 
revised provisions and practices following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
emphasise greater coordination RIWKH(8·VH[WHUQDOFRPSHWHQFHV as a means of ensuring 
coherence.5 The scope of the CFSP did not changed drastically, but its status and 
institutional arrangements within the Treaty were changed quite significantly. The CFSP 
is also listed as a separate Union competence in Article 2(4) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) WRGLVWLQJXLVKLWIURPRWKHU¶JHQHUDO·
competences.  
 
This distinguishing of the CFSP from other policies continues a strong tradition of 
¶RWKHUQHVV· of the policy in the legal order of the EU. CFSP is generally, and accurately, 
characterised as a legal expression of (some of) WKH0HPEHU6WDWHV·IHDURIWKH
encroachment on national sovereignty. A particular fear is that the Court of Justice, 
which does not enjoy the same level of oversight of the CFSP as in other areas, would 
attempt to extend supranational EU legal principles to the CFSP. Bearing in mind the 
KLVWRU\RILQVWLWXWLRQDO¶VSLOORYHU·LQ(8FRPSHWHQFHVRYHUWKH\HDUVthe Treaty 
DPHQGPHQWVDSSHDUWRDWWHPSWWRVWHPWKH¶%UXVVHOVL]DWLRQ·RIWKH&)63ZKHUH¶the 
member states have in practice entered a slippery slope of integration with decision-
making coPSHWHQFH´FUHHSLQJµWR%UXVVHOV·6 That is not to say that the role of the CJEU 
is negligible, however, insofar as it maintains a role in policing the parameters of the 
CFSP and other competences. Neither can it be said that the attempted exclusion of the 
CJEU from the CFSP is straight-forward in a practical sense, as the case-law since 
Lisbon demonstrates.7 
                                                 
4 See, in particular, Eileen Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2002), Ramses A. Wessel, 7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·V)RUHLJQDnd Security Policy: 
A Legal Institutional Perspective (Kluwer Law International 1999), Ricardo Gosalbo Bono, 
¶6RPH5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH&)63/HJDO2UGHU·Common Market Law Review 
337. For a more recent analysis, Ramses A. :HVVHO¶/H[,PSHUIHFWD/aw and Integration 
in European )RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·2016) 1 European Papers 439. 
5 6HHIRUH[DPSOH+DUWPXW0D\HU¶7KH&KDOOHQJHRI&RKHUHQFHDQG&RQVLVWHQF\LQ(8
)RUHLJQ3ROLF\·LQ0DULR7HOzDQG)UHGHULN3RQMDHUWHGV7KH(8·V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\:KDW
Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action? (Routledge 2013) 105 
6 +HOHQ6MXUVHQ¶1RWVRLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDODIWHUDOO"2QGHPRFUDF\DQGLQWHJUDWLRQLQ
(XURSHDQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·Journal of European Public Policy 
1078, 1090. 
7 Case C-455/14 P, H v Council of the European Union, European Commission and 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) of 19 July 2016, EU:C:2016:569. This case concerned the 
competence of the CJEU in hearing an action for annulment directed against decisions 
taken by the Head of an EU mission established under the CFSP. The CJEU, unlike the 
General Court, confirmed that it is competent. See the casenote by: Peter Van Elsuwege 
(2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 841. See also Christophe Hillion, ¶A Powerless 
Court? The European Court of Justice and the EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy·, in Marise Cremona and Anne Thies, The European Court of Justice and External 
Relations Law - Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing 2014). 
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The Treaty, as amended at Lisbon, commits the EU to a strong, value-led approach to 
external relations (Article 21(1) TEU). The Court has confirmed that CFSP is an integral 
part of the EU·VOHJDORUGHU, and is thus VXEMHFWWRWKH(8·VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOYDOXHVDQG
norms.8 The Treaty articles which govern the entirety of the CFSP and non-CFSP 
GLPHQVLRQVWRWKH8QLRQ·VDFWLYLWLHVDUHZLGHLQVFRSHDQGJLYHVRPHLQGLFDWLRQWR(8·V
purported values, though only a few are aimed towards specific goals.9 Leading the 
application of foreign policy in the field falls to an EU diplomatic service and Foreign 
Minister in all but name (respectively, the European External Action Service (EEAS)10 
and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy).11 A related innovation in 
the attempt to bring together the CFSP and other externally-focussed competences was 
the new TEU section on consistency and coherence.12 Article 23 TEU makes the CFSP 
VXEMHFWWRQHZJHQHUDOSURYLVLRQVRQWKH8QLRQ·VH[WHUQDODFWLRQ(Articles 21-46 TEU). 
 
The position of the CFSP in the constitutional order is the most obvious area where 
stated aims lack the legal structures to bring DERXWHIIHFWLYH¶VXSUDQDWLRQDO· policies. The 
¶&RPPRQ·LQ&)63can be something of a misnomer since the same word is associated 
with the Common Commercial Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy, both of 
which indicate integration of EU law and policy (and therefore suggestive of something 
PRUHWKDQ¶FRPPRQ· Rather, the CFSP is the only area which applies to all Member 
6WDWHVZKHUH¶VSHFLILFSURYLVLRQV· for decision-making apply.13 This does not require 
0HPEHU6WDWHVWRVXEVFULEHWRD¶FRPPRQ·SROLF\LQWKHVDPHZDy as in the other areas.14 
Article 24 (1) TEU makes clear that unanimous voting in the Council remains the core of 
                                                 
8 C-455/14 H v Council of the European Union, European Commission and European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU:C:2016:569. 
9 For example, in Article 21 (2)H7(8¶WKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIall countries into the world 
economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international 
WUDGH· 
10 For a comprehensive analysis of the EEAS, see the contributors to David Spence and 
Jozef Bátora (eds), The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
11 6HHIRUH[DPSOH(LOHHQ'HQ]D¶7KH5ROHRIWKH+LJK5HSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH8QLRQIRU
)RUHLJQ$IIDLUVDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·LQ+DUPDQQ-Josef Blanke and Stelio Mangiameli 
(eds) The European Union after Lisbon: Constitutional Basis, Economic Order and 
External Action 6SULQJHUDQG8ZH3XHWWHU¶The Latest Attempt at 
Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Intergovernmentalism 
in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination·LQ3DXO-DPHV&DUGZHOOHG(8
External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (Springer/Asser Press 2012) 17. 
12 2QFRKHUHQFHVHH0DULVH&UHPRQD¶&RKHUHQFHLQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQIRUHLJQUHODWLRQV
ODZ·LQ3DQRV.RXWUDNRVHGEuropean Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward 
(OJDU&KULVWRSKH+LOOLRQ¶7RXVSRXUXQXQSRXUWRXV&RKHUHQFHLQWKHH[WHUQDO
UHODWLRQVRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·LQ0DULVH&UHPRQDHGDevelopments in EU External 
Relations Law (Oxford University Press 2008); 6LPRQ'XNH¶&RQVLVWHQF\&RKHUHQFHDQG
(8([WHUQDO$FWLRQ·LQ3DQRV.RXWUDNRVHGEuropean Foreign Policy: Legal and Political 
Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2011). 
13 Articles 136²7)(8DUHDOVRGHILQHGDV¶VSHFLILFSURYLVLRQV·but only for those 
Member States whose currency is the euro: the specificity is due to their application to 
certain Member States only rather than the policy area itself, as for the CFSP. 
14 Paul James Cardwell, EU External Relations and Systems of Governance: the CFSP, Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and Migration (Routledge 2009) 47. 
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CFSP decision-making. Furthermore, even when abstaining, Member States are provided 
a further opportunity to signal their lack of agreement: Article 31 (1) TEU allows a 
0HPEHU6WDWHWR¶qualify its abstention E\PDNLQJDIRUPDOGHFODUDWLRQ·. This is unique in 
the Treaty15 and thus allows any Member State to free itself from the obligation to apply 
a CFSP decision, even though that decision will bind the EU.16 The special nature of 
foreign policy at the heart of the Treaty arrangements is thus evident and one which the 
UK has been particularly protective of, as examined below. 
 
Common strategies, created in Treaty of Amsterdam as an instrument for structuring EU 
action in specific areas, remain unchanged. But in practice they are hardly ever used. The 
(8KDVSUHIHUUHGWRDJUHH¶VWUDWHJLF· documents which do not rely on a specific legal 
basis, including the European Security Strategy (2003), Stabilisation and Association 
Process for South-East Europe (2003) and now the Global Strategy (2016).17 ¶$FWLRQVWo 
EHXQGHUWDNHQ·DQG¶SRVLWLRQVWREHWDNHQ· ZKLFKDUHPDGHRQWKHEDVLVRI¶decisions of 
the European Council on the strategic intereVWVDQGREMHFWLYHVRIWKH8QLRQ· are adopted 
by qualified majority in the Council (Article 31 (2) TEU), as an exception to the usual 
rule of unanimity (Article 31 (1) TEU). This provision appeared to offer an opportunity 
for majority voting which coulGKDYHGHYHORSHGLQWRWKH¶QRUP·RI&)63GHFLVLRQ-
making and signal its move away from intergovernmentalism as its hallmark. Article 32 
TEU points to the poVVLELOLW\RID¶FRPPRQDSSURDFK· on CFSP matters which could 
therefore be used for a similar purpose. However, a Member State may block a decision 
taken by qualified PDMRULW\LILWFRQIOLFWVZLWK¶important and stated reasons of national 
SROLF\· (Article 23(2)). This again underlines the unique nature of the CFSP, since such a 
provision allowing a national veto despite majority voting taking place is found nowhere 
else in the Treaty.18   
 
Even when decisions under the CFSP are taken, which Article 28(2) TEU specifies 
¶FRPPLWWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVLQWKHSRVLWLRQVWKH\DGRSWDQGLQWKHFRQGXFWRIWKHLU
DFWLYLW\·SUDFWLFHVKRZVWKDWGHFLVLRQVKDYHDQDUURZVFRSHZKLFKGRHVQRWWKHUHIRUH
prevent Member States operating parallel national policies.19 Although criticism of the 
CFSP has long been levelled at the instruments lacking the enforceability of regulations 
and directives, contemporary criticism tends to focus on the difficulty of EU institutions 
                                                 
15 Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 207. 
16 Piris notes that this provision has only been used once, by Cyprus in 2008 regarding 
the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo. Jean-Claude Piris, The Future of Europe 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 77. 
17 7KLVLVH[SORUHGIXUWKHULQ3DXO-DPHV&DUGZHOO¶(XUR0HG ENP and the Union for 
WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ2YHUODSSLQJ3ROLF\)UDPHVLQWKH(8·V*RYHUQDQFHRIWKH
0HGLWHUUDQHDQ·JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 219. See also Geert 
De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford University Press 2008) 
115; Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 391; 
Panos Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart 2006) 399 and Stephan Keukeleire 
and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 
2008) 154-156. 
18 3DXO-DPHV&DUGZHOO¶2Q5LQJ-Fencing the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 
WKH/HJDO2UGHURIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
443-463. 
19 Bart Von Vooren and Ramses A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 398. 
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acting coherently.20 IQVWLWXWLRQDO¶IX]]LQHVV·LQWKHcomplex arrangements in external 
representation of the EU in the post-Lisbon era,21 stemming from overlap in 
competences under the CFSP and elsewhere in the Treaties, has given rise to a string of 
cases before the CJEU.22 There is also a conceptual link with the opt-outs from the area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice secured by the UK (along with Denmark and Ireland), 
which the UK has, unsuccessfully, attempted to defend in the CJEU where the legal basis 
of external agreements are concerned.23  
 
,IWKH&)63ZDVRULJLQDOO\SURPRWHGDVDPHDQVIRUWKH(8WR¶DFW·ZKLFKVXJJHVWVTXLFN
responses to the global issues of the day, then it has failed to live up to this promise. 
Where the EU has been more successful in putting words into action has been where the 
&)63GUDZVRQWKH(8·Vestablished and recognised strengths ² primarily economic ones 
² in order to bolster its international identity. This is significant for the debate on the 
future of post-Brexit relations between the UK and the EU since any cooperation within 
the CFSP relies on cooperation elsewhere. 
 
Two points can be made in support of this assertion. First, the vast majority of CFSP 
instruments used in the post-Lisbon period concern the use of restrictive measures 
(sanctions) on third countries or individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism.24 
There are over 30 active sanctions regimes in place. Sanctions are both a foreign policy 
tool and a legal instrument, capable in some circumstances of bring challenged in the 
courts and following a (albeit unique) legislative process. Typically, sanctions cover 
limitations on imports and exports of goods, the provisions of services, embargoes on 
dual-use goods and any arms of related material and travel bans on individual leaders. 
Some, such as the sanctions on Iran regarding its nuclear programme, were agreed in a 
UNSC resolution,25 but the EU has also added individuals to the sanctions list 
unilaterally.26 
 
6DQFWLRQVFRQQHFWIRUHLJQSROLF\DFWRUQHVVZLWKWKH(8·VFRQVLGHUDEOHHFRQRPLFZHLJKW
aQGLQPDQ\FDVHVKDYHEHFRPHWKH¶JRWR·UHPHG\DWWKH(XURSHDQOHYHO¶6PDUW·
                                                 
20 6WHIDQ/HKQH¶,V7KHUH+RSHIRU(8)RUHLJQ3ROLF\"·
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_322_Lehne_EU1.pdf> accessed 3 December 
2018. 
21 Geert De Baere and Ramses A. :HVVHO¶(8/DZDQGWKH(($62I&RPSOH[
&RPSHWHQFHVDQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQVHTXHQFHV·LQ David Spence and Jozef Bátora (eds), 
The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2015) 175. 
22 In particular, Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council EU:C:2014:2025, para 45 
23 Case C-656/11 United Kingdom v Council EU:C:2014:97 and C-81/13 United 
Kingdom v Council EU:C:2014:2449. For more detailed analysis, see Ricardo Gosalbo-
%RQRDQG)UHGHULN1DHUW¶7KH/LVERQ7UHDW\DQG&RXQFLO3UDFWLFH·LQ3LHW(HFNKRXW
and Manuel Lopez-Escudero (eds) 7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·V([WHUQDO$FWLRQLQ7LPHVRI&ULVLV 
(Hart/Bloomsbury 2016) 13, 50-53. 
24 Christina Eckes ¶(8&RXQWHU-Terrorist Sanctions against Individuals: Problems and 
3HULOV·(XURSHDQ)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV5HYLHZ3DXO-DPHVCardwell, The 
Legalisation of European Foreign Policy and the Use of Sanctions (2015) 17 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Law Studies 287. 
25 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1737 (2006). 
26 Charlotte Beaucillon ¶&RPPHQWFKRLVLUVHVPHDVXUHVUHVWULFWLYHV· EUISS 
Occasional Paper No. 100, 15. 
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sanctions are emphasis as a means of avoiding negative economic consequences on 
vulnerable populations and to affect only those in power. There is, however, 
considerable debate as to whether the dependency on sanctions as punitive measures 
GUDZVDZD\IURPWKHQRUPDWLYH¶YDOXHV·WKH(8LVVXSSRVHGWRSURPRWH.27 Yet, in a 
measure such as a travel ban on officials from a third country, the sheer weight of 28 
Member States acting together increases their effectiveness. The extent to which 
sanctions have been imposed, or at the very least discussed in the Council, mean that it is 
little exaggeration to say that the CFSP has become oriented towards sanctions as an 
appropriate response to global or regional problems in many different scenarios. As 
discussed below, the UK has been forthright in promoting the imposition of sanctions 
on third countries, most notably on Russia after its annexation of Crimea.28  
 
Second, the EU has gradually moved the emphasis of its international role towards 
longer-term strategy building, and using its considerable economic strength to support 
foreign policy goals. Seen in this light, the Global Strategy is therefore the latest attempt 
to focus the minds of the Member SWDWHVLQZD\VZKLFKGUDZRQWKH(8·VVXSSRVHG
strength in pursuing longer-term goals and drawing on its economic standing.  This is 
SDUWLFXODUO\LQHYLGHQFHLQWKHHPHUJHQFHRI¶UHVLOLHQFH·LQWKH*OREDO6WUDWegy and EU 
policy-making. ¶5HVLOLHQFH·KDVEHFRPHDIDVKLRQDEOHEX]]ZRUGLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV
DQGSDUWLFXODUO\LQSROLF\IRUPDWLRQWRZDUGVWKHJOREDO6RXWK,WVXLWVWKH(8·VVHOI-
SURFODLPHGHPSKDVLVRQLWV¶YDOXHV·LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVDQGFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQDVD
¶QRUPDWLYHSRZHU·$VZHOODVLWVWKHRUHWLFDOFRQQRWDWLRQVSXWWLQJ¶UHVLOLHQFH·LQWR
practice suits a practical approach: avoiding the thorny issues of military engagement, the 
EU (or, correctly put, its participating member states) can focus on humanitarian efforts, 
including those relating to climate change. As an approach to complex problems, Joseph 
has claimed that resilience-building has evolved to the extent that is now best conceived 
DVD¶GLVWLQFWIRUPRIJRYHUQDQFH·29 
 
As a result of what it perceives to be successful efforts and an ability to gain its own 
identity¶UHVLOLHQFH·SOD\VDFHQWUDOSDUWLQWKH*OREDO6WUDWHJ\It is mentioned 34 times in 
total. It appears in almost every aspect of the strategy which has been put in place so far, 
according to the first annual progress report.30 ¶5HVLOLHQFH·UHODWHVWR¶VWDWHVDQGVRFLHWLHV·
and ¶GHPRFUDFLHV·.31 Of particular significance here, however, is the regional focus on the 
(8·V¶QHDUDEURDG·LQ6RXWK-east Europe and Turkey.32 ¶5HVLOLHQFH·LVDOVRH[SOLFLWO\OLQNHd 
WRPLJUDWLRQWR(XURSHLQWKHIROORZLQJWHUPV¶7KH(8ZLOOVXSSRUWGLIIHUHQWSDWKVWR
resilience, targeting the most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal and 
climate/energy fragility, as well as develop more effective migration policies for Europe 
                                                 
27 KODXV%UXPPHU¶,PSRVLQJ6DQFWLRQV7KH1RW6R´1RUPDWLYH3RZHU(XURSHµ·
14 European Foreign Affairs Review 191. 
28 Council Decision (EU) 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive 
measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine [2014] OJ 
L229/13. 
29 -RQDWKDQ-RVHSK¶The EU in the Horn of Africa: Building Resilience as a Distant 
)RUPRI*RYHUQDQFH·-&06-RXUQDORI&RPPRQ0DUNHW6WXGLHV 285. 
30 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy¶)URP
Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the Global Strategy ² <HDU·%UXVVHOV
2017). 
31 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (n 1) 2-3. 
32 ibid 4 
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DQGLWVSDUWQHUV·33 7KHUHLVDOVRPHQWLRQRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIUHVLOLHQFH¶RIFULWLFDO
infrastructure, networks and serYLFHVDQGUHGXFLQJF\EHUFULPH·$MRLQWVWDWHPHQWIURP
the Commission and High points to specific instances where the EU has already had 
success or to particular means that the strategy can be operationalized.34 These are found 
LQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·V$FWLRQ3ODQIRU5HVLOLHQFHLQ&ULVLV-Prone Countries 2013-2020, 
which emphasises resilience in selected African countries in the Sahel and Horn of 
Africa.35 
 
What is notable about both the Global Strategy and the documents which put in place 
the promotion of resilience is that they do not rely solely on competences under the 
CFSP. Rather, and reinforcing the paradox of an all-inclusive CFSP (in the terms of the 
Treaty) which leaves out important areas such as development cooperation, the various 
Action Plans do not mention the CFSP at all. Instead, the extent to which cooperation 
between the various institutions of the EU is stressed: a point made in direct response to 
the criticisms made of the EU since the inception of the CFSP that it is a vague policy 
without teeth, belonging to an unwieldy and inefficient polity. The UK has consistently 
underlined the specific nature of the CFSP as immune to the same type of integration as 
in, for example, the single market. Since the UK has now opted to leave the EU, the 
character, dynamics and the future direction of the CFSP are brought into question. 
 
The United Kingdom and the CFSP: awkward partner, or just awkward? 
 
Successive UK governments have resisted any attempts to allow the CFSP to become 
OHVVLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO3DUWO\WKLVFDQEHH[SODLQHGE\WKH8.·VEHOLHILQWKHYDOXHRIWKH
EU as a trade-focussed polity, which provided its motivation for eventually joining the 
FOXE%XWDOVREHFDXVHRIWKH8.·VRZQlong-standing place on the global stage, as 
demonstrated by its permanent UN Security Council seat, role in NATO and close 
alliance with the United States and, to a lesser and declining extent, countries of the 
Commonwealth. Unlike smaller EU states, the UK has seen no need to use the CFSP as 
a means of gaining visibility in international affairs (though this does not preclude the 
ability to use CFSP to amplify national foreign policy, as discussed below).36 The UK has 
expressed a constant fear from the outset of the institutionalisation of EPC into the 
CFSP that it would be used as a means of usurping national foreign policy prerogatives. 
 
During the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Maastricht, the UK was, however, not 
alone in insisting that the structure of the EU architecture emphasiVHGWKH¶RWKHUQHVV·RI
the CFSP. As Wallace has explained, 
 
¶2QLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWVLGHGZLWK)UDQFHDJDLQVW
*HUPDQ\DUJXLQJYLJRURXVO\IRUDQLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO¶WKUHH-SLOODU·VWUXFWXUHWR
bring foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation within a 
                                                 
33 ibid 7 
34 Joint Communication from the High Representative and the Commission 
to the EuropHDQ3DUOLDPHQWDQGWKH&RXQFLO¶A Strategic Approach to 
ResilieQFHLQWKH(8·VH[WHUQDODFWLRQ·-2,1ILQDO 
35 &RPPLVVLRQ¶&RPPLVVLRQ·V$FWLRQ3ODQIRU5HVLOLHQFHLQ&ULVLV-Prone Countries 
2013-2020·6:'ILQDO 
36 See, for example, Ben Tonra, Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch Danish and 
Irish Foreign Policies in CFSP (Ashgate 2001); Henrik Larsen, Analysing the Foreign Policy of 
Small States in the EU (Palgrave 2005). 
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single treaty framework, rather than the integrated Community accountable to a 
strengthened European Parliament for which Chancellor Kohl and his 
JRYHUQPHQWKDGSUHVVHG·.37 
 
Neither were France and the UK unsupported in their efforts to permit only an 
intergovernmental CFSP in the Treaty. A Dutch proposal to integrate CFSP into what 
EHFDPHWKH¶&RPPXQLW\·SLOODULQ6HSWHPEHUZDVRSSRVHGE\'HQPDUN*UHHFH
and Portugal as well as France and the UK.38 The stark division into two camps of 
¶&RPPXQLWDULVWV·DQG¶3(6&DOLVWV·crystallised the national views of where foreign policy 
and European integration meet.39 This has seemingly not subsisted over time as the 
divisions between Member States on headline foreign policy issues has not only been a 
matter of perception, but of actual practice too. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was perhaps 
WKHVWDUNHVWH[DPSOHGLYLGLQJ¶ROG·DQG¶QHZ·(XURSHDQGSODFLQJ8.DQG)UDQFHRQ
opposing sides in supporting US actions. M. Smith and Steffenson noted soon after that, 
¶7KHFROODSVHRI(XURSHDQVROLGDULW\LQWKHKHLJKWRIWKH,UDTFULVLVOHDGLQJWRWKHVWDQG-
RIIEHWZHHQ¶ROG·DQG¶QHZ·(XURSHDQGWRLQWHQVHIULFWLRQVEHWZHHQ%ULWDLQDQG)UDQFH
in particular, seemed to indicate that wherever the US placed intense demands on the 
(8·VIRUHLJQSROLF\V\VWHPWKHUHZRXOGEHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIGLVLQWHJUDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQD
JUHDWOHDSIRUZDUGLQFRRSHUDWLRQ·40 7KH8.·VVXSSRUWRI(8HQODUJHPHQWWRWKH(DVW
was largely based on the belief that a larger, diverse Union would make deeper 
integration, including in foreign policy, less likely.41 Coupled with the concurrent 
enlargement of NATO to the East, the UK was consistent in stating its commitment to 
the defence and security aspects being centred on NATO rather than the EU. 
 
The consistency has transcended Conservative (until 1997 and since 2010) and Labour-
led (1997-2010) governments. The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed whilst the UK was 
under the leadership of PM Tony Blair during his most pro-EU phase, contained a 
¶FRQYROXWHGIRUPXOD·LQWKH7UHDW\¶LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHVHFRQGVXE-paragraph, which 
might lead to a common defence..·ZKLFKZDVLQVHUWHGDWWKHLQVLVWHQFHRIWKH8.$V
Wall recalls, the formula ¶papered over a gap between those, led by the British, who 
wanted to ensure the primacy of NATO in European territorial defence and to limit the 
role of EU forces to peacekeeping tasks, and those such as the French who wanted 
Europe to assume great autonomy in defence. 42 The same arguments about the CFSP 
were playing out between the Member States, despite the changes in government. 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Nice did not allow the provisions of ¶HQKDQFHGFRRSHUDWLRQ·
to apply in the CFSP because of pressures during the Intergovernmental Conference 
                                                 
37 William :DOODFH¶)RUHLJQ3ROLF\·LQDennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon (eds), The 
Major Effect (Macmillan 1994) 
38 Michael E. Smith, (XURSH·V)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\WKH,QVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQRI&RRSHUDWLRQ 
(Cambridge University Press 2004), 181 
39 Yves Buchet de Neuilly, /·(XURSHGHOD3ROLWLTXH(WUDQJHUH (FRQRPLFD¶3(6&·
is the French-ODQJXDJHDFURQ\PRI¶&)63· 
40 Michael Smith and Rebecca Steffenson¶7KH (8DQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV·LQ&KULVWRSKHU
Hill and Michael Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2005) 351 
41 .DUHQ(6PLWK¶(QODUJHPHQWDQG(XURSHDQLQ&KULVWRSKHU+LOODQd Michael Smith 
(eds) International Relations and the European Union (Oxford University Press 2005) 276 
42 Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 169 
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coming from the UK. Once again, the fault line was the role of NATO in ensuring 
(XURSH·VGHIHQFH.43 
 
The UK also insisted that the Treaty of Lisbon maintained the separateness of the CFSP 
RUGHUGHVSLWHWKH¶FROODSVH·RIWKHSLOlar system installed in the TEU. David Miliband, the 
(then) UK Foreign Secretary was at pains to stress this legal complication in the 
following terms to the UK Parliament: ¶Common foreign and security policy remains 
intergovernmental and in a separate treDW\,PSRUWDQWO\«WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI
-XVWLFH·VMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUVXEVWDQWLYH&)63SROLF\LVFOHDUO\DQGH[SUHVVO\H[FOXGHG$V
agreed at Maastricht, the ECJ will continue to monitor the boundary between CFSP and 
other EU external action, such as development assistance. But the Lisbon treaty 
considerably improves the existing position by making it clear that CFSP cannot be 
affected by other EU policies.·44 As noted above, this risked oversimplifying the status of 
the CFSP, especially since the CJEU has now held45 that it is competent to deal with 
CFSP subject matter when referred to it from a national court via the preliminary 
reference.46 But the statement speaks to the consistent claims in the UK that EU foreign 
policy can only go so far and must exist in parallel to national policy. 
 
On the institutional arrangements and competences therefore, the UK has been one of 
Member States preventing further integration, and doing so in a very public way. 
However, singular accounts of the UK as a singular blocking force overstates the 
reticence which other Member States shared about foreign policy integration as distinct 
from almost all other areas where sovereignty has been pooled. As Allen noted in 2005, 
¶:KHQERWK)UDQFHDQG*HUPDQ\LQWHUYHQHGWo veto the application of QMV [qualified 
majority voting] to areas of policy where they had their own domestic concerns, it 
became clear tKDWWKH\KDGEHHQ¶IUHHULGLQJ· WKDWLVKLGLQJEHKLQG%ULWDLQ·VREVWUXFWLRQ
RIIXUWKHULQWHJUDWLRQ·47 7KH¶RWKHUQHVV· of the CFSP could continue to be seen when the 
¶WKLUGSLOODU·RQMXVWLFHDQGKRPHDIIDLUVZDVEURXJKWPRUHIXOO\LQWRWKH(8·V
mainstream legal order. However, the UK negotiated an opt-out which has not therefore 
prevented other Member States from closer cooperation and integration. The reticence 
amongst other Member SWDWHVUHJDUGLQJWKH¶FRPPXQLWDULVDWLRQ·RIWKH&)63VXJJHVWV
that the UK has not been the only stumbling block. 
 
                                                 
43 Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power (Cambridge University Press 
2009) 65. 
44 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (David Miliband), HC Deb, 
20 February 2008, col 378. Emphasis added. 
45 C-72/15 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v Her Majesty's Treasury and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:236. See *UDKDP%XWOHU¶7KH&RPLQJRI$JHRIWKH&RXUW·V
-XULVGLFWLRQLQWKH&RPPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·(XURSHDQ
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO/DZ5HYLHZ6DUD3ROL¶7KH&RPPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\
after Rosneft: still impeUIHFWEXWJUDGXDOO\VXEMHFWWRWKH5XOHRI/DZ·
Common Market Law Review 1799. 
46 Article 267 TFEU. 
47 'DYLG$OOHQ¶7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRPD(XURSHDQL]HG*RYHUQPHQWLQDQRQ-
(XURSHDQL]HG3ROLW\·LQ6LPRQ%XOPHUDQG&KULVWLDQ/HTXHVQHThe Member States of the 
European Union (Oxford University Press 2005) 125. 
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Neither does a singular account take into consideration where the UK has taken a 
proactive stance in functional or strategic cooperation. As with other Member States, the 
UK has used the CFSP as a conduit for amplifying its own foreign policy voice.48 
Of the numerous practical examples, Bickerton highlights the (as it was) European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo in 2004. This was conducted outside the auspices of NATO but relied on UK 
support for the French proposal for an EU force. The timing was significant, coming 
soon after the divisions on Iraq.49 UK support for the French-led intervention in Mali in 
2014 was an even more recent underlining of this point.  
 
On the policies put in place under the CFSP, including those such as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy which relied RQ¶FURVVSLOODU·FRPSHWHQFHVWKH8.KDVJHQHUDOO\
been supportive if not always at the forefront of efforts. Efficiency and effectiveness of 
WKH&)63DSSHDUWRKDYHEHHQWKH8.·VPDLQFRQFHUQVDQGZKLOVWLQVLVWLQJRQDVHSDUDWH
national foreign policy DQGLQVWLWXWLRQDODSSDUDWXV¶LWORQJDJRUHFRJQL]HGWKHIDFWWKDW
WKH(8LV%ULWDLQ·V¶SRLQWRIGHSDUWXUH·ZKHQLWFRPHVWRIRUHLJQSROLF\UDWKHUWKDQWKH
first thing that Britain bumps into·.50 7KLVSRLQWZDVUHLQIRUFHGLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VRZQ
¶%DODQFHRI&RPSHWHQFHV·UHYLHZon the benefits and drawbacks of EU membership in 
2012 which found that the evidence pointed to a strengthened role in world affairs via 
(8PHPEHUVKLSDQGWKDW¶LWZDVJHQHUDOO\VWURQJO\LQWKH8.·VLQWHUHVWVWRZRUNWKURXJK
WKH(8LQIRUHLJQSROLF\·51 7KLVLQFOXGHGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WR¶XSORDG·8.SULRULWLHVYLD
the CFSP, with sanctions on Myanmar/Burma being a case in point52 and now likely 
include Russian sanctions (imposed since 2014) too. The comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of UK involvement in the CFSP, and the relationship of the policy with 
other aspects of European integration merit setting out in full: 
 
¶The key benefits included: increased impact from acting in concert with 27 other 
countries; greater influence with non-EU powers, derived from our position as a 
OHDGLQJ(8FRXQWU\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOZHLJKWRIWKH(8·VVLQJOHPDUNHWLQFOXGLQJ
its power to deliver commercially beneficial trade agreements; the reach and 
magnitude of EU financial instruments, such as for development and economic 
SDUWQHUVKLSVWKHUDQJHDQGYHUVDWLOLW\RIWKH(8·VWRROVDVFRPSDUHGZLWKRWKHU
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGWKH(8·VSHUFHLYHGSROLWLFDOQHXWUDOLW\ZKLFK
enables it to act in some cases where other countries or international 
organisations might not.  
 
Again according to the evidence, the comparative disadvantages of operating 
through the EU are: challenges in formulating strong, clear strategy; uneven 
                                                 
48 +\ONH'LMNVWUDDQG6RSKLH9DQKRRQDFNHU¶7KH&RPPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·
(2017) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (forthcoming) 7.  
49 Christopher J. Bickerton, European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to Functionality 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 128. 
50  'DYLG$OOHQ¶7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRPD(XURSHDQL]HG*RYHUQPHQWLQDQRQ-
(XURSHDQL]HG3ROLW\·LQ6LPRQ%XOPHUDQG&KULVWLDQ/HTXHVQHThe Member States of the 
European Union (Oxford University Press 2005) 138-9 
51 +0*RYHUQPHQW¶5HYLHZRIWKH%DODQFHRI&RPSHWHQFHVEHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG
Kingdom and the European Union  - )RUHLJQ3ROLF\·
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227
437/2901086_Foreign_Policy_acc.pdf> accessed 3 November 2017, 87. 
52 ibid 87. 
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leadership; institutional divisions, and a complexity of funding instruments, 
which can impede implementation of policy; and sometimes slow or ineffective 
decision-making, due to complicated internal relationships and differing interests. 
One commentator summarised it thuV¶The issue is not legal competence, but 
FRPSHWHQFHLQJHQHUDO· Some argued that the EU is at its most effective when 
the Member States, in particular the UK, France and Germany, are aligned and 
driving policy.·53  
 
This final point is supported by the fRUPHUKHDGRI0,WKH8.·VLQWHUQDWLRQDO
LQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFH¶The common thread in British influence since the end of the cold 
war is our co-operation with France and Germany. The three powers, working in the -
framework of a common European policy, represent Europe and together count for 
VRPHWKLQJLQWKHZRUOG·54 
 
Many of the advantages cites in the Review relate less to the CFSP in isolation but as a 
counterpart of the economic dimensions of WKH(8·VH[WHUQDOUHODWLRQVIndeed, in the 
period following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the UK government (a 
Conservative-led coalition with the Liberal Democrats) made clear its intention to regard 
the CFSP and the new European External Action Service (EEAS) as merely one point in 
D¶QHWZRUNHGDSSURDFK·55 to national foreign policy. Rather, the government (and 
particularly the Conservative party within it) was at pains to demonstrate the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIDQDWLRQDOIRUHLJQSROLF\¶ZKLFKGRHVQRWVHH(8IRUHLJQSROLF\DVDNH\
SUHURJDWLYH·56  
 
This indifference to the EU and the CFSP manifested itself in several ways. For example, 
in an era of threats from Islamic terrorism, the government emphasised the role of the 
¶ILYHH\HV·VHFXULW\community (with four English-speaking, non-EU countries: USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand) as a cornerstone of UK foreign and security policy. 
This was in evidence in the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum of 2014.57 
Membership is not open to other states, as Germany has discovered.58A further example 
was a much-trumpeted agreement with Canada to share diplomatic resources, announced 
by the Foreign Secretary in 2012.59 The agreement has not, it seems, led to any concrete 
LQLWLDWLYHVRWKHUWKDQ8.DQG&DQDGLDQFLWL]HQVEHLQJDEOHWRUHO\RQHDFKRWKHU·V
                                                 
53 ibid 7. 
54 John Sawers¶%ULWDLQRQLWVRZQZLOOFRXQWIRUOLWWOHRQWKHZRUOGVWDJH·Financial Times 
(London, 20 June 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/1e11c6a0-54fe-11e7-80b6-
9bfa4c1f83d2> accessed 3 November 2017. 
55 Richard G. Whitman¶7KH8.DQG(8)RUHLJQ6HFXULW\DQG'HIHQFH3ROLF\DQ
2SWLRQDO([WUD·87 Political Quarterly 254  
56 5LFKDUG*:KLWPDQDQG%HQ7RQUD¶:HVWHUQ(80HPEHU6WDWHVIRUHLJQSROLF\JHR-
RULHQWDWLRQV·LQ$PHOLD+DGIield, Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman, Foreign Policies of 
EU Member States: Continuity and Europeanisation (Routledge 2017) 38, 49 
57 +0*RYHUQPHQW¶6FRWODQG$QDO\VLV6HFXULW\·&PG. 
58 5LFKDUG0F*UHJRU¶,QWHOOLJHQFHWKH $OO6HHLQJ(\HV·)LQDQFLDO7LPHV/RQGRQ
December 2013) <https://www.ft.com/content/719f86bc-63ea-11e3-98e2-
00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e2> 
59 James Blitz and Hannah Kuchler¶8.DQG&DQDGDWR6KDUH(PEDVVLHV·Financial Times 
(London, 24 September 2012) <https://www.ft.com/content/4a31dcac-0625-11e2-
a28a-00144feabdc0> accessed 3 November 2017.  
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consular services in third countries.60 Nevertheless, the publicity surrounding the 
announcement seemed to be designed to underline WKH8.·VFRQWLQXHGDWWDFKPHQWWR
non-EU powers and a willingness to distance itself from greater EU cooperation in 
foreign and security policy. 
 
Recent UK strategy documents issued before the referendum, including the National 
Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015) did not prioritise 
involvement in EU frameworks LQWKH8.·V defence and security.61 Rather, the national 
strategy notes the (8·VFRQVLGHUDEOHFDSDELOLWLHVWR¶build security and respond to 
threats·, but these should be seen PHUHO\DV¶complementary to those of NATO·.62 
Although the EU is mentioned at other points in the document, these are generally 
where the internal market competences overlap with foreign policy (such as sanctions 
and arms embargoes) and the UK would be Treaty-bound not to act unilaterally. 
 
The fact that the Treaty does not formally constrain Member States in policy-making 
outside the framework of EU law allowed the UK government to demonstrate (to both a 
national audience and the EU) that it was still capable of being an independent player. As 
Wallace has noted, this view is not new but in many ways a continuation of ChXUFKLOO·V
view of the post-ZDU8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶%ULWDLQUHPDLQHGDJOREDOSRZHULQ&KXUFKLOO·V
HQFDSVXODWLRQEHFDXVHLWUHWDLQHGXQLTXHLQIOXHQFHLQ¶WKUHHFLUFOHV·RIJOREDOSROLWLFVWKH
Anglo-American special relationship, the British Commonwealth and Europe ² the first 
of these bringing us the most advantages, the last carrying the most military and other 
EXUGHQV·63  
 
Beyond the rhetoric of the government, analysis of UK foreign policy on global issues in 
recent years does not bring to the fore the European dimension. For example, in Ralph et 
al·V detailed analysis of UK policy regarding the Syrian crisis,64 the EU is only mentioned 
once in relations to the sanctions measure of arms embargos (a CFSP decision 
subsequently followed by a Regulation). 6LPLODUO\'DGGRZ·V examination of the 
ideational underpinnings of the Conservative²Liberal Democrat FRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW·V
foreign policy from 2010 to 2015 focusHVRQRQO\WKH8.·VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(8
UDWKHUWKDQ(8IRUHLJQSROLF\DQGWKH8.·VFRQWribution to it).65  
 
Once again, although this was disappointing from the perspective of those in the UK 
and EU who feel the UK should play a fuller part in driving forward the CFSP, there are 
always likely to be problems in doing so given the overlapping nature of other foreign 
policy-focussed international organisations in Europe. As Benediek has noted, and with 
returning to the new-found emphasis on resilience in EU policy-making¶7KH(8LVRQO\
one pillar ² and far from an autonomous one ² in a European security architecture that 
also encompasses NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, to name but the most 
                                                 
60 I am grateful to Charles Tannock MEP for his help on this point. 
61 +0*RYHUQPHQW¶National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security 
Review·&PG 
62 ibid 53. 
63 :LOOLDP:DOODFH¶Losing the narrative: the United Kingdom and the European Union 
as imagined communities· (2017) 31 International Relations 192-209, 198 
64 -DVRQ5DOSK-DFN+ROODQGDQG.DOLQD=KHNRYD¶Before the vote: UK foreign policy 
discourse on Syria 2011²·5HYLHZRI,QWHUQDWLRQDOStudies (forthcoming) 17. 
65 2OLYHU'DGGRZ¶&RQVWUXFWLQJD¶JUHDW·UROHIRU%ULWDLQLQDQDJHRIDXVWHULW\
Interpreting coalition foreign policy, 2010²2015·International Relations 303-318 
 15 
LPSRUWDQWLQVWDQFHV,WLVDQREYLRXVFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKH(8·VIXWXUHUHVLOLHQFHHIIRUWV
should concentrate on civil emergency response while military action is conducted in the 
VFRSHRIWUDQVDWODQWLFFRRSHUDWLRQLQFORVHFROODERUDWLRQZLWK1$72·66 Neither can 
&)63DVD¶SROLWLFDO·IRUHLJQSROLF\, which includes the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) as an integral part,67 be fully separated from the commercial interests of 
the Union. For example, the CSDP PLVVLRQ(81$9)256RPDOLD¶$WDODQWD·ZDV
designed to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden, explicitly for the purpose of protecting 
merchant ships in the area, transporting goods from Europe to Asia.68 
 
,QVKRUWWKHUHIRUHWKH8.·VWUDFNUHFRUGYLV-à-vis the CFSP is one which demonstrates 
that it has been relatively engaged in practice. The evidence suggests that it has more to 
gain than to lose by projecting its own foreign policy via the prism of the EU, since it is 
difficult to detect any foreign policies which strictly separate the UK from the rest of the 
EU27. However, any enthusiasm demonstration for foreign policy action under the EU 
banner is tempered by a consistent need to satisfy a (perceived) sceptical domestic 
audience. Successive governments thus have maintained a distance in their discourse on 
the benefits of the CFSP in order to appear to be not too involved or sacrificing UK 
interests. As Witney states, µWKHULVLQJWR[LFLW\RIWKH¶(-ZRUG·>¶(XURSHDQ·@in domestic 
politics·PHDQWWKDWLQWKHUXQ-up to the 2015 general election, neither of the two main 
UK political parties (the Conservatives and Labour) were prepared to ¶do anything, 
however sensible, which could open them to the charge of pro-Europeanism·69 
 
In many ways, this official stance LVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH8.·VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(8
more generally: though the special nature of foreign policy at the heart of state 
sovereignty perhaps means that the spotlight is shone more brightly on any moves 
towards foreign policy integration than other areas, even externally-focussed ones. With 
its consistent history of reluctance towards institutional changes to the CFSP, the UK 
could be assumed to lead any opposition to change during the periodic Treaty reviews. 
 
The EU referendum and the invisibility of foreign policy 
 
Foreign policy was not an area of discussion in Prime Minister CameroQ·Vdrive for a 
new settlement between the UK and the EU after he was re-elected (with a Parliamentary 
                                                 
66 Annegret Benediek (2016) The Global Strategy for the E8·V)RUHLJQDQG Security 
Policy, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs) Comments 38/2016, 3 <https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C38_bdk.pdf> accessed 3 
November 2017. 
67 $VSHU$UWLFOH7(8¶7he common security and defence policy shall be an 
integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with 
an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them 
on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the 
Member States.· 
68 -RULV/DULN¶0XFK0RUHWKDQ7UDGHWKH&&3LQD*OREDO&RQWH[W·LQ0DOFROP(YDQV
and Panos Koutrakos (eds) Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between 
the EU and the Rest of the World (Hart 2011) 12, 30. 
69 1LFN:LWQH\¶7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRPDQGWKH&6'3·LQ Daniel Fiott (ed) The Common 
Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives (Academia Press 2015) 16. 
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majority) in 2015.70 Although immigration was the most contentious issue in both the 
renegotiation and the eventual referendum campaign, the focus was mainly on free 
movement rights within the EU and was not therefore within the scope of foreign 
policy.71 There was some conflation of external migration as a result of EU foreign 
policy, particularly refugee resettlement, but this was largely ignorant of the opt-outs the 
UK already had in this area. Finally, there was some debate over the likelihood of further 
enlargement of the EU, particularly regarding Turkey, but this was also related to free 
movement and immigration, rather than foreign policy per se.  
 
The only relevant point in the final settlement for the discussion here was a more general 
one. The Treaty provisions on an ¶ever closer union·, which had become to be regarded 
as a potential threat of further integration in sensitive areas including foreign and security 
policy were clarified. According the Council conclusions on the new settlement, the 
provisions, ¶do not offer a legal basis for extending the scope of any provision of the 
Treaties or of EU secondary legislation. They should not be used either to support an 
extensive interpretation of the competences of the Union or of the powers of its 
institutions as set out in the Treaties·.72 Prime Minister Cameron and his government 
therefore did not seek to make an issue of the CFSP or to substantially alter tKH8.·V
role in it. 
 
As such, CFSP did not play a major role in the referendum campaign. Neither the 
¶UHPDLQ·RU¶OHDYH·FDPSDLJQVPDGHJUHDWDWWHPSWVWRH[WROWKHYLUWXHVRUGUDZEDFNVRI
EU foreign policy coordination or actions, beyond general considerations of whether it is 
better to work within a coordinated European framework to confront global issues or 
not. There was more discussion of defence policy. The leave campaign attempted to 
highlight moves towards establishing a European army to replace national armies, which 
resulted in the remain camp having to (somewhat ironically) go on the defensive to point 
out that defence integration can only move forward with the express permission of the 
Member States, and one which the UK was not prepared to give. The same can also be 
said of the ¶threat·SRVHGE\DQHPHUJHQW(XURSHDQIRUHLJQSROLF\ WRWKH8.·V
permanent UN Security Council (UNSC) seat. Although an ¶EU seat· in the UNSC has 
been mooted for some time by various EU institutional actors (such as former High 
Representative for Foreign Policy, Javier Solana) it has never reached the stage of a 
formal proposal.73 Prompting discussion of these issues did propel, to at some degree, 
the CFSP into the debate, but largely on dimensions which are highly unlikely to ever be 
realised. 
 
¶%UH[LWPHDQV%UH[LW·¶*OREDO%ULWDLQ·DQGother slogans in search of a policy 
 
Following the referendum, there has similarly been little discussion of CFSP, either in 
WHUPVRIZKDWWKH8.H[SHFWVWRGRDIWHUOHDYLQJRUZKDWLWZRXOGPHDQIRUWKH8.·V
                                                 
70 (XURSHDQ&RXQFLO¶European Council meeting FRQFOXVLRQVDQG)HEUXDU\·
EUCO 1/16. 
71 Kenneth A. Armstrong, Brexit Time: Leaving the EU ² Why, How and When? (Cambridge 
University Press 2017) 32 
72 (XURSHDQ&RXQFLO¶European Council meeting concluVLRQVDQG)HEUXDU\·
EUCO 1/16, 16 
73 Jan Wouters and Anna-/XLVH&KDQp¶%UXVVHOVPHHWV:HVWSKDOLDWKH(8DQGWKH81·
in Piet Eeckhout and Manuel Lopez-Escudero (eds) 7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·V([WHUQDO$FWLRQ
in Times of Crisis (Hart/Bloomsbury 2016) 299, 309. 
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UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(80XFKPRUHIRFXVERWKGRPHVWLFDOO\DQGLQWKH¶SKRQH\ZDU· 
pre-phase of discussions, has been given to external commercial relations. Yet, given the 
8.·VVWUHQJWKVLQIRUHLJQSROLF\JOREDOUHVRXUFHVDQGPLOLWDU\UHVRXUFHVWKHUHZDVDQ
early recognition that this could be used as a means of facilitating negotiations in other 
areas.74 This is supported by the speed at which Prime Minister David Cameron, before 
his resignation in the aftermath of the referendum, tried to assure EU Members that the 
UK would continue to play a key role in the CFSP and CSDP until Brexit.75 
 
,Q3ULPH0LQLVWHU0D\·V letter to Council President Tusk which triggered Article 50 TEU 
of 29 March 2017, there was no mention of WKHZRUGV¶IRUHLJQSROLF\·+owever, the 
following extract gained significant attention: 
 
¶We want to make sure that Europe remains strong and prosperous and is 
capable of projecting its values, leading in the world, and defending itself from 
security threats. We want the United Kingdom, through a new deep and special 
partnership with a strong European Union, to play its full part in achieving these 
goals. We therefore believe it is necessary to agree the terms of our future 
partnership alongside those of our withdrawal from the European Union.·76 
 
These words were taken in some quarters to the UK using its relative military and 
VHFXULW\LQWHOOLJHQFHVWUHQJWKVDVDPHDQVRIWKUHDWHQLQJWKH(8WRRIIHUD¶JRRG·H[LW
deal. For the purposes of the argument here, whether or not this point should be taken 
as a threat, this part of the letter reveals that (a) there is an inherent recognition of the 
QHHGIRUFRRSHUDWLRQEIRUHLJQSROLF\LVVWURQJO\OLQNHGWR¶LQWHUQDO·SROLFLHVDQGWKH
internal resilience of the Union. 
 
)RULWVSDUWWKH(8·VQHJRWLDWLQJJXLGHOLQHVIRU%UH[LWQRWHWKDW¶The EU stands ready to 
establish partnerships in areas unrelated to trade, in particular the fight against terrorism 
and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.·77 The framing of 
¶DUHDVXQUHODWHGWRWUDGH·FOHDUO\GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWthe CFSP, including defence, are not 
likely to be the primary areas for negotiation (or indeed difficulty) during the Brexit 
QHJRWLDWLRQV,QGHHGWKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQRIIRUHLJQSROLF\KHUHDVWKH¶RWKHU·VXJJHVWVWKDW
CFSP is not an area where the EU expects great attention to be devoted. As such, this 
supports the argument here that Brexit and the CFSP can be seen as more of a process 
of gradual decoupling WKDQD¶FOLIIHGJH·RU¶VKRFN·DVLVWKHFDVHLQPDQ\RWKHUareas of 
integration. 
 
                                                 
74 3DWULFN:LQWRXU¶'HIHQFHFRRSHUDWLRQWDONVZLWK(8FRXOGGHOD\%UH[LWSURFHVV·
Guardian (London, 18 November 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/18/defence-cooperation-talks-with-
eu-could-delay-brexit-process> accessed 3 November 2017. 
75 &KDUOHV7DQQRFN0(3¶%UH[LW7KH6HFXULW\'LPHQVLRQ·
<http://www.charlestannock.com/brexit-security-dimension.pdf> accessed 3 
November 2017. 
76 3ULPH0LQLVWHU·V2IILFH¶3ULPH0LQLVWHU·VOHWWHUWR'RQDOG7XVNWULJJHULQJ$UWLFOH· 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-
triggering-article-50/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50> accessed 
3 November 2017.  
77 European Council, ¶&RQFOXVLRQV1HJRWLDWLQJ*XLGHOLQHVIRU%UH[LW·(8&2;7
20004/17, 7. 
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As is the case in so many areas in which UK policy has been entwined with that of the 
EU over more than 40 years, a new model for cooperation in CFSP requires careful 
though ² assuming that both parties wish to do so. In theory, this should be less 
problematic than in many other areas: since diplomatic missions, armed forces and even 
SROLF\VWDWHPHQWVKDYHUHPDLQHGVHSDUDWHIURPWKH&)63DQG(($6WKH¶H[WUDFWLRQ·
from the EU should not entail lengthy debates. 
 
The UK government set out a ¶IXWXUHSDUWQHUVKLS· paper on Foreign Policy, Defence and 
Development in September 2017.78 This was one of seven such papers contributing to 
WKH8.·VYLVLRQRID ¶QHZGHHSDQGVSHFLDOSDUWQHUVKLS·ZLWKWKH(8 The document is 
notable for the similarity it bears to the previous Balance of Competences review,79 
insofar as tKH8.DQGWKH(8·VIRUHLJQSROLF\SULRULWLHVDSSHDUWREHDOPRVWFRPSOHWHO\
DOLJQHG,QIDFWLQVWUHVVLQJWKH8.·VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH&)63DQGDELOLW\WRSURMHFWLWV
own priorities and set the debate (such as in imposing sanctions, as discussed below) the 
document seems as though it is a case for being part of the EU, rather than setting out a 
¶QHZ·DUUDQJHPHQW 
 
Even if the future partnership paper is enthusiastic for continued cooperation in this 
dimension of European governance, the discussion above of the links between CFSP 
and other areas of EU integration demonstrate that removing the UK should 
nevertheless not be underestimated. This is implicit in the partnership paper, which 
considers the CFSP alongside development, defence and aspects of external migration 
There is no comprehensive assessment of how the UK will extract itself from the CFSP. 
Whilst from a legal perspective this is certainly less problematic that in many other areas 
(such as the single market), there are nevertheless important and potentially complex 
issues to resolve and which, in addition to the points raised above, connect CFSP to 
policies on aid and development, trade, sanctions, climate change, and energy, all of 
which rely on overlapping competences in the Treaties.80 Therefore, whilst it might be 
GHEDWHGZKDWWKH¶ODZ·LQ&)63FRQVLVWVRIWKHUHLVOLWWOHGRXEWWKDWWKHUHJXODU¶ODZ·LQ
other dimensions of integration will not make extraction from the CFSP straightforward 
in reality. 
 
In particular, the extensive use of restrictive measures (sanctions) by the European 
Union over the past 15 years is a case in point. There are over 30 sanctions regimes in 
place, some of which are the result of UN sanctions, but others (such as on Russia) 
which are the product of autonomous EU measures. The latter are put in place by 
combination of a CFSP instrument, followed by a regulation. The UK will need to find a 
way to replicate these, which will also depend heavily on the relationship ² should there 
be one ² between the UK and EU single market and/or customs union, and whether this 
is a temporary or permanent solution. Restrictive measures are therefore one extremely 
diverse category which represent a highly complex legal issue to be resolved, in addition 
to the administrative, budgetary and operational issues of the CFSP. The UK 
                                                 
78 +0*RYHUQPHQW¶)RUHLJQSROLF\GHIHQFHDQGGHYHORSPHQWDSRVLWLRQSDSHU·
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643
924/Foreign_policy__defence_and_development_paper.pdf> accessed 3 November 
2017. 
79 HM Government (n 51) 
80 Karen E. 6PLWK¶Brexit and British foreign policy: between a rock and a hard place·
(UK in a Changing Europe, 20 June 2017) <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-british-
foreign-policy-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/> accessed 3 November 2017. 
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JRYHUQPHQW·VIXWXUHSDUWQHUVKLSSDSHUUHIHUVWR¶its own national legal framework for 
sanctions·ZKLOVWKLJKOLJKWLQJ¶a strong mutual interest in cooperation and collaboration 
with European partners·.81 Whilst this indicates the potential for alignment between EU 
and UK sanctions, the paper correctly notes that such alignment would require 
information sharing. The UK would thus be in a substantially different position to other 
non-Member States who align with EU sanctions as a fait accompli.  
 
The situation that the UK and the EU find themselves in is thus unprecedented. 
Furthermore, there is no obvious model upon which future EU-UK relations regarding 
CFSP can easily be based. Much depends on the political will of two sides decide to work 
on areas of common interest which would therefore provide an impetus to resolve the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOTXHVWLRQV7KLVLVGHSHQGHQWRIFRXUVHRQWKH8.·VRZQYLVLRQRID¶*OREDO
%ULWDLQ· which prioritises relations with countries across the globe at the expense of 
prioritising European relations. 
 
As the discussion above demonstrates, the CFSP is not a hermetically-sealed category 
with the EU legal order. Various non-EU states have a form of relationship with the 
CFSP. The candidate states become gradually more involved as their candidacy moves 
forward as part of the acquis, and so do states including Norway and Iceland. These, and 
RWKHUDVVRFLDWHGVWDWHVLQWKH(8·VQHLJKERXUKRRGLQFOXGLQJVWDWHVLQWKH:HVWHUQ
Balkans and the Caucuses), have aligned themselves with various CFSP policies, 
including sanctions regimes. There is thus a possibility that the UK might continue to 
play a part in the CFSP in some form after Brexit. And of course the UK would join 
several states including Norway and Turkey as a NATO member in Europe which is not 
part of EU, or in process of joining. This is significant, because NATO is mentioned 16 
times in the Global Strategy, with a great emphasis on cooperation with non-EU NATO 
members. However, cooperation via NATO is fraught with difficult, with political 
deadlock the norm (largely due to the dispute between Cyprus ² an EU Member State, 
but not a NATO Member ² and Turkey) even though organisational cooperation can be 
effective.82  
 
Whitman identifies three possible scenarios for the UK in the CFSP post-Brexit: as either 
an ¶LQWHJUDWHGSOD\HU·an ¶DVVRFLDWHGSDUWQHU·or a ¶GHWDFKHGREVHUYHU·83 In the first, the 
UK would have a bespoke, special status in which it would retain involvement in 
EDWWOHJURXSV&6'3RSHUDWLRQVDVD¶UHYHUVH'HQPDUNSRVLWLRQ·84) and participation in 
the Foreign Affairs Council for relevant matters.  But of course it would be outside the 
PDLQVWUHDPIRUDIRUGLVFXVVLRQDQGVWUDWHJLFGLUHFWLRQ$VDQ¶DVVRFLDWHGSDUWQHU·LWV
position would be closer to that of Norway, having no membership of the Foreign 
$IIDLUV&RXQFLOEXWD¶GLDORJXH·RQUHODWHGLVVXHV85 Whilst it would still have the 
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opportunity to participate in battlegroups and the European Defence Agency via specific 
agreements, this would appear to be a functional arrangement with little or no influence 
over policy-PDNLQJ$WWKHORZHVWHQGRIWKHVFDOHD¶GHWDFKHGREVHUYHU·ZRXOGmean 
that the UK would not participate in any institutional formats and would probably be 
limited to participation in civilian missions on a case-by-case basis.  
 
In any of these scenarios, Brexit means that the UK would lack any capability to steer the 
direction of the CFSP. Even being IUHHRIWKH¶SROLWLFDO·EDJJDJHRIEHLQJWRRFORVHO\
associated with EU missions in this area of closely guarded national sovereignty, we do 
not yet know to what extent the UK could conceivably play a constructive role and how 
receptive the rest of the EU27 will be. The operational, technical and administrative 
LPSOLFDWLRQVFDQQRWEHIXOO\FRQVLGHUHGXQWLOWKH¶ELJSLFWXUH·SROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQVDUH
settled.86  
 
)RULWVSDUWWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW·Vfuture partnership paper gives few concrete details 
DERXWKRZWKHPRRWHG¶GHHSDQGVSHFLDOSDUWQHUVKLS·EHWZHHQWKH8.DQGWKH(8FRXOG
EHIRUJHGLQOHJDORULQVWLWXWLRQDOWHUPV,WUHLWHUDWHVWKHGHVLUHIRU¶FORVHFROODERUDWLRQ·
DQG¶FRRSHUDWLRQ·LQDOPRVWDOOWKHNH\DUHDVFRYHUHGE\the CFSP and Global Strategy 
DQGUHOLHVRQDQDVVXPHGGHVLUHWKDWWKH8.·VLQGLYLGXDOGLSORPDWLFDQGPLOLWDU\VWUHQJWK
would be a strong motivating factor for the EU. It would therefore appear that the 
JRYHUQPHQW·VDLPLVVRPHZKHUHEHWZHHQWKH¶LQWHJUDWHGSOD\HU·DQG¶DVVRFLDWHGSOD\HU· 
models as identified by Whitman. However, although the paper expresses the desire for 
WKH8.·VLQYROYHPHQWZLWK(8IRUHLJQSROLF\VKRXOGJREH\RQGLWVUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKDQ\
other third country, it is difficult to imagine how, in the words of the paper, a future 
SDUWQHUVKLS¶unprecedented in its breadth·87 can be reconciled with the end result of the 
UK as a third country.  
 
As the history of the CFSP demonstrates, cooperation in this policy area, no matter how 
strong a common political desire for it to be so, is contingent on agreement on many 
other areas ² including those which the UK government appears unwilling to 
compromise on, such as the jurisdiction of the CJEU.88 Whilst at the meta-level it might, 
in theory, be possibly for a joint dialogue between the UK and EU on an agreed strategic 
approach to foreign policy ² including emphasising resilience ² this would seem to be 
counter-intuitive to WKHSXUSRVHRI%UH[LWDQGWKHPDQWUDRI¶WDNLQJEDFNFRQWURO·ZKLFK
was so prominent in the referendum campaign. Since the effectiveness of placing 
UHVLOLHQFHDWWKHFRUHRI(8IRUHLJQUHOLHVRQWKHFRKHUHQFHRIWKH(8·VLQVWLWXWLRQV
instruments and policies, an agreed approach with an outsider would not seem the 
opportune means to do this. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is ironic that in the domain of foreign and security policy where there is little evidence 
that the material interests of the UK and the rest of the EU differ substantially, the UK is 
set to leave the institutional mechanisms which might help turn the Global Strategy into 
reality. ,WLVDOVRXQIRUWXQDWHWKDWWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJHVWRWKH(8·VIRUHLJQSROLF\
                                                 
86 +\ONH'LMNVWUD¶8.DQG(8)RUHLJQ3ROLF\&RRSHUDWLRQDIWHU%UH[LW·586,
Newsbrief 1 
87 HM Government (n 78) 18 
88 3ULPH0LQLVWHU·V2IILFHQ76) 
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structure, including the creation of the EEAS, were created at a time of major foreign 
policy challenges89 and which are only now beginning to be consolidated. The process of 
Brexit is likely to prove to be another major challenge to the workings of the CFSP and 
fulfilment of the goals of the Global Strategy. Nevertheless, tKH8.·VGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH
(8KDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWR¶UDGLFDOO\DOWHUWKH(8GHEDWH· in both tone and substance.90 
 
Outside of the EU and with a relationship as yet to be determined, the extent to which 
UK can advance its own agenda through the EU will be severely diminished. And even if 
associated in some way with the EU, UK would have to accept a foreign policy role as a 
¶rule taker· rather than as a ¶rule maker·, and as a follower rather than as a leader. 
$OWKRXJKWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW·VIXWXUHSDUWQHUVKLSSDSHULVRptimistic about the role to 
be played by the UK, this appears to be only aspirational. The history of the CFSP tells 
XVWKDWLWV¶LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO·ODEHOLVQRWDIXOO\DFFXUDWHFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQZLWKLQWKH
(8·VOHJDORUGHU,QWKHDEVHQFHRIFRPSOH[DJUHHments setting out the broader nature of 
future UK-EU relations, it is difficult to see how the UK could play a role in CFSP, even 
if the political will to do so exists. 
 
Even some Eurosceptics in the UK find reason to suggest that without the ¶troublesome· 
UK, the EU will be able to forge ahead in integrating foreign policy or other areas that it 
chooses.91 The UK meanwhile will be left to forge new alliances in the context of its 
¶*OREDO%ULWDLQ·LPDJHWKRXJKLWLVE\QRPHDQVFOHDUZKRWKHVHZLOOEHLQIRreign policy 
or security terms any more so than in the economic fields. 6LQFHD¶*OREDO%ULWDLQ·UHOLHV
on a particular kind of identity, much will also depend on the way in which the rest of 
the world reacts to the consequences of Brexit and subsequently sees the UK.92 The UK 
may have underestimated the willingness of individual Member States to deal with the 
UK bilaterally in case involvement or cooperation in the CFSP context is not possible. 
)UDQFHLVDFDVHLQSRLQW¶)UDQFHKDVSHUVLVWHGZLWKWKHLGHDof Anglo-French 
coordination at the heart of a successful EU foreign, security and defence policy despite 
the reticence of recent British governments in respect of an EU defence policy. It is not 
yet clear as to whether Brexit would reduce the tempo of colODERUDWLRQ·93 That would 
leave open the question of who the UK would cooperate with, and to what ends. 
 
For the CFSP itself, however, the argument has been made here that Brexit should not 
unduly affect the policy. There are much fewer risks associated with the UK leaving the 
CFSP than, in particular, the single market, without a comprehensive future arrangement. 
                                                 
89 0RULW]3LHSHU¶7DNLQJVWRFNRIWKH´FRPPRQµLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·V&RPPRQ
)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·LQ-DDS=ZDDQ0DUWLMQ/DN$ELROD0DNLQZDDQG3LHW
Willems (eds) Governance and Security Issues of the European Union (Springer/Asser Press 
2017) 273, 278 
90 5LFKDUG*:KLWPDQDQG%HQ7RQUD¶:HVWHUQ(80HPEHU6WDWHVIRUHLJQSROLF\JHR-
RULHQWDWLRQV·LQ$PHOLD+DGILHOG,DQ0DQQHUVDQG5LFKDUG*:KLWPDQForeign Policies of 
EU Member States: Continuity and Europeanisation (Routledge 2017) 38, 43  
91 John 5HGZRRG03¶,W·VQRWMXVWWKH8. that will benefit from Brexit - the EU will 
too·The Guardian (London, 20 June 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/20/not-just-uk-benefit-
brexit-eu> accessed 3 November 2017. 
92 Rebecca Adler-1LVVHQ&KDUORWWH*DOSLQDQG%HQ5RVDPRQG¶Performing Brexit: How 
a post-Brexit world is imagined outside the United Kingdom·%ULWLVK-RXUQDORI
Politics and International Relations (forthcoming). 
93 Whitman (n 83) 45. 
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Although CFSP is unlikely to occupy a major part of the UK-EU negotiations over the 
next two years, BrexiWDSSHDUVDOPRVWDVD¶QDWXUDO·SURJUHVVLRQRISROLFLHVDOUHDG\SXWLQ
place by previous UK governments with the EU as only one of its points in a network.  
 
TKHHPSKDVLVRQ¶UHVLOLHQFH· in CFSP as a long-term goal places the focus squarely on the 
EU neighbourhood, which the UK has had much less direct involvement in than many 
other Member States. Furthermore, successful neighbourhood policies rely on what the 
EU can offer. 7KH(8ZRXOGUHWDLQWKHDELOLW\WRSRWHQWLDOO\RIIHUD¶ZD\LQ·WRLWOXFUDWLYH
internal market to neighbourhood states in exchange for cooperation. Visa facilitation 
could be on offer to key partners, and since the UK was not part of these aspects of EU 
SROLF\LWZLOOQRWDIIHFWWKH(8·VDELOLW\WRSXUVXHWKHPLILWZLVKHV 
 
But neither will the departure of the UK necessarily remove the obstacles for the EU27 
to pursue greater integration of foreign policy. Although there is always the potential for 
the CFSP to move forward, caution must be exercised. The UK has been a difficult 
partner in the EU and in particular the CFSP, but it is by no means the only one. It is not 
conceivable that the UK alone has prevented integration in foreign policy: other areas 
where the UK has been reticent (e.g. Schengen, the single currency, justice and home 
affairs) this has not prevented treaty dispositions which have allowed the other Member 
States to move forward. Further to this, we might add the lack of enthusiasm for use of 
WKH¶HQKDQFHGFRRSHUDWLRQ·SURYLVLRQVLQWKH7UHDW\ZKLFKZHUHextended to the CFSP 
in the Treaties of Nice (except for matters with military or defence implications) and 
Lisbon (removing the Nice exceptions)94 and which would enable a minimum of only 
nine Member States to pursue advanced integration.  
 
Therefore, we find ourselves returning to the familiar standpoint of CFSP. Greater 
institutional coherence and realisation of the aims of the Global Strategy will only come 
about if the remaining EU27 Member States make greater use of the dispositions on 
offer and commit more fully to text of the Treaty, in particular its spirit as encapsulated 
in Article 24 (1) TEU. 
 
                                                 
94 Article 20 TEU and Articles 326-334 TFEU. 
